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Below is the abstract and a general summary for
my article,
"Blob Theory:
N-adic Properties Do Not Exist" |
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Abstract:
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I
argue for blob theory: the philosophic position that n-adic properties
do not exist. I discuss hitherto unnoticed problems to do with the
theories of property possession in the ontological theories of ordinary
objects: the bundle theory of objects and substance theories of objects.
Specifically, I argue that theories of property possession involved with
the bundle theory and substance theories of objects involve contradiction. |
General Summary:
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Blob theory is the philosophical
position that the properties of things, such as the properties of the
objects that we experience in our ordinary empirical life (colors, extension and
solidity of objects, etc.), do not exist. Blob theory leads to
the conclusion that there are no substances, and thus no things at all.
Blob theory has also been called metaphysical nihilism or
mereological nihilism.
The reality humans experience is a
reality of properties. For example, the apple is red, where red is what
we experience, and is believed to be a property of the apple. According to blob theory,
our experience is wrong, and there is no mind-independent redness, with
respect to this example of the apple's color. But this example could be
comparably given for any items perceived, wherein blob theory leads to
the conclusion that there
are no things.
Due to blob theory's disagreement with
ordinary empirical experience, blob theory is overwhelmingly rejected by
contemporary philosophers, especially philosophers in the Western
analytic tradition. Consider just one example of a well-known
philosopher discussing her rejection of blob theory,
…[A] purely physical world… lacking all…
properties… is a world entirely without individuating structure: The
Blob. Even if such a world is possible, it seems quite clear that it is
not our world, and thus, that it would be of no particular interest to
the physicalist.[1]
Blob theorists typically maintain that
empirical experiences are mere mental fabrications, and what actually
exist are absolutely propertyless and/or structureless basic building
blocks (that are apparently non-empirical and irreducible). Although
philosophers in the Western tradition, especially the Western analytic
tradition, often imply (as does the citation above) that (1) blob theory
can merely be disregarded without argument, and/or (2) blob theory is
not a serious philosophical position, that however appears to be a
highly dubious stance on the topic, since blob theory, or something very
close to it, is a philosophical position that has been held by some of
the most prominent Western philosophers through history, such as
Immanuel Kant
and W. V. O. Quine.
Blob theory leads to the conclusion that,
despite what humans may believe to be the case about reality due to what
they (believe they) experience about reality with their senses in their
everyday life, their senses are lying to them, and their sense
experiences are about objects that do not exist, or only exist as mental
apparitions. Blob theory also leads to the position that reality in fact
does not have any structure at all: reality is only composed of
structureless[3]
particles.
Blob
theory is of course in stark opposition to our empirical experience, but
interestingly, blob theory appears to apparently have much in common
with the theories of what reality is like at the quantum level (at the
tiniest level of reality that we know to exist). In other words, quantum
theory and blob theory are both in opposition to empirical experience,
but this may just mean that our empirical experiences are incorrect, and
they do not describe how reality actually is. (Most philosophers in the
Western analytic tradition assume that empirical experience is
correct, and therefore, due to that assumption, blob theory is
incorrect, and the findings of quantum theory are somehow incomplete.)
Instead, reality may merely be composed of structureless and
featureless,
indistinguishable quantum particles, which is a position
supported by blob theory and by quantum mechanics. Of course, if quantum
mechanics and blob theory are correct, it would mean that the reality
that humans experience in their daily life, which is a reality of
colors, surfaces, and moving solids (such as when a person witnesses a
cloud floating by, which she experiences as a white surface moving
slowly in the sky), is an illusion, and/or are is a creation and
fabrication somehow generated by the very act of experiencing, having no
basis in reality itself.
Lastly, blob theory
involves the amazing position that mental states can only be
propertyless and unstructured. This, of course, leads to the
difficult-to-understand position that a self's empirical experiences of
color patches, for example, are not actually happening, and if one could
experience properly, experiencing what actually exists, one would
experience a structureless, colorless, immaterial, and undifferentiated
reality. This is, ironically, the very reality described by Advaita
Vedanta, and by early Indian Buddhists (see
abstract atomism for discussion).
Click here to go to:
"Blob Theory:
N-adic Properties Do Not Exist",
Sorites,
vol. 17.

[1]
Maddy, P., 1990, “Physicalistic Platonism”, in Irvine,
A. D. (ed.), Physicalism in
Mathematics,
Kluwer: New York, pp. 259-289, page 273.
This has to do with Kant's transcendental idealism (KTI), which is, in
Allison's words, unpopular among philosophers (Kant's
Transcendental Idealism, Yale, 2004, p. 3). According to KTI, only
(1) what Kant calls things in themselves, which are much like
philosophic
atoms, and which are the real items that exist in
mind-independent reality, and (2) mental states about empirical objects (where the empirical
objects are mental fabrications and do not reflect what exists in
mind-independent reality) are the items that exist and make up
reality. Kant writes:
External things,
namely matter, are... nothing but mere appearances, that is,
representations in us, of whose reality we are directly conscious...
Objects... in themselves remain unknown to us... If I remove the
thinking subject, the whole corporeal world must vanish.
(A371-372, A379, A383)
[3]
This is the way physicists often refer to the electron or quark, as
being structureless, since they have no evidence
for its having any parts, or, as they say, they have no evidence for
it having any internal structure. Consider the following passage from
University of Michigan physicist George Kane
Why… do we think that electrons and quarks are the true ‘Greek
atoms’…? [I]nvestigators have tried by many means to determine whether
electrons, quarks… and gluons show any evidence of structure, and they
have not found any. These experiments probed perhaps 10,000 times
further than it took to see structure in the past, but electrons and
quarks continue to behave as point-like objects with no parts. (Kane,
2000, Sypersymmetry, 21)
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