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The greater part of what my neighbors call good I believe in my soul to be bad, and if I repent of anything, it is very likely to be my good behavior. What demon possessed me that I behaved so well?
-H.D. Thoreau, WALDEN, Ch. 1

Go to "Corporatism: The Secret Government of the New World Order" page

 

 

Blob Theory

Jeffrey Grupp

www.AbstractAtom.com

2006

Click here to read the entire article, "Blob Theory: N-adic Properties Do Not Exist," that has been published in  Sorites, vol. 17

Below is the abstract and a general summary for my article, "Blob Theory: N-adic Properties Do Not Exist"

Abstract:

I argue for blob theory: the philosophic position that n-adic properties do not exist. I discuss hitherto unnoticed problems to do with the theories of property possession in the ontological theories of ordinary objects: the bundle theory of objects and substance theories of objects. Specifically, I argue that theories of property possession involved with the bundle theory and substance theories of objects involve contradiction.

General Summary:

    Blob theory is the philosophical position that the properties of things, such as the properties of the objects that we experience in our ordinary empirical life (colors, extension and solidity of objects, etc.), do not exist. Blob theory leads to the conclusion that there are no substances, and thus no things at all. Blob theory has also been called metaphysical nihilism or mereological nihilism.

    The reality humans experience is a reality of properties. For example, the apple is red, where red is what we experience, and is believed to be a property of the apple. According to blob theory, our experience is wrong, and there is no mind-independent redness, with respect to this example of the apple's color. But this example could be comparably given for any items perceived, wherein blob theory leads to the conclusion that there are no things.

     Due to blob theory's disagreement with ordinary empirical experience, blob theory is overwhelmingly rejected by contemporary philosophers, especially philosophers in the Western analytic tradition. Consider just one example of a well-known philosopher discussing her rejection of blob theory,

 

…[A] purely physical world… lacking all… properties… is a world entirely without individuating structure: The Blob. Even if such a world is possible, it seems quite clear that it is not our world, and thus, that it would be of no particular interest to the physicalist.[1]

     Blob theorists typically maintain that empirical experiences are mere mental fabrications, and what actually exist are absolutely propertyless and/or structureless basic building blocks (that are apparently non-empirical and irreducible). Although philosophers in the Western tradition, especially the Western analytic tradition, often imply (as does the citation above) that (1) blob theory can merely be disregarded without argument, and/or (2) blob theory is not a serious philosophical position, that however appears to be a highly dubious stance on the topic, since blob theory, or something very close to it, is a philosophical position that has been held by some of the most prominent Western philosophers through history, such as Immanuel Kant[2] and W. V. O. Quine.

     Blob theory leads to the conclusion that, despite what humans may believe to be the case about reality due to what they (believe they) experience about reality with their senses in their everyday life, their senses are lying to them, and their sense experiences are about objects that do not exist, or only exist as mental apparitions. Blob theory also leads to the position that reality in fact does not have any structure at all: reality is only composed of structureless[3] particles.

    Blob theory is of course in stark opposition to our empirical experience, but interestingly, blob theory appears to apparently have much in common with the theories of what reality is like at the quantum level (at the tiniest level of reality that we know to exist). In other words, quantum theory and blob theory are both in opposition to empirical experience, but this may just mean that our empirical experiences are incorrect, and they do not describe how reality actually is. (Most philosophers in the Western analytic tradition assume that empirical experience is correct, and therefore, due to that assumption, blob theory is incorrect, and the findings of quantum theory are somehow incomplete.)

     Instead, reality may merely be composed of structureless and featureless, indistinguishable quantum particles, which is a position supported by blob theory and by quantum mechanics. Of course, if quantum mechanics and blob theory are correct, it would mean that the reality that humans experience in their daily life, which is a reality of colors, surfaces, and moving solids (such as when a person witnesses a cloud floating by, which she experiences as a white surface moving slowly in the sky), is an illusion, and/or are is a creation and fabrication somehow generated by the very act of experiencing, having no basis in reality itself.

      Lastly, blob theory involves the amazing position that mental states can only be propertyless and unstructured. This, of course, leads to the difficult-to-understand position that a self's empirical experiences of color patches, for example, are not actually happening, and if one could experience properly, experiencing what actually exists, one would experience a structureless, colorless, immaterial, and undifferentiated reality. This is, ironically, the very reality described by Advaita Vedanta, and by early Indian Buddhists (see abstract atomism for discussion).

 

Click here to go to:

"Blob Theory: N-adic Properties Do Not Exist", Sorites, vol. 17.

 

 

[1] Maddy, P., 1990, “Physicalistic Platonism”, in Irvine, A. D. (ed.), Physicalism in Mathematics, Kluwer: New York, pp. 259-289, page 273.

 

[2] This has to do with Kant's transcendental idealism (KTI), which is, in Allison's words, unpopular among philosophers (Kant's Transcendental Idealism, Yale, 2004, p. 3). According to KTI, only (1) what Kant calls things in themselves, which are much like philosophic atoms, and which are the real items that exist in mind-independent reality, and (2) mental states about empirical objects (where the empirical objects are mental fabrications and do not reflect what exists in mind-independent reality) are the items that exist and make up reality. Kant writes:

 

External things, namely matter, are... nothing but mere appearances, that is, representations in us, of whose reality we are directly conscious... Objects... in themselves remain unknown to us... If I remove the thinking subject,  the whole corporeal world must vanish. (A371-372, A379, A383)

 

[3] This is the way physicists often refer to the electron or quark, as being structureless, since they have no evidence for its having any parts, or, as they say, they have no evidence for it having any internal structure. Consider the following passage from University of Michigan physicist George Kane

 

Why… do we think that electrons and quarks are the true ‘Greek atoms’…? [I]nvestigators have tried by many means to determine whether electrons, quarks… and gluons show any evidence of structure, and they have not found any. These experiments probed perhaps 10,000 times further than it took to see structure in the past, but electrons and quarks continue to behave as point-like objects with no parts. (Kane, 2000, Sypersymmetry, 21)