Grupp response to prof manson on atheism paper

[The following point… is Manson’s most important one. I will break up Manson’s exact passage into four pieces that I will label M₁ to M₄.

M₁: (iv) The author claims (again on p. 4) that "Often philosophers assert that the concept of a relation between or among entities in space and an entity (or entities) not in space must (somehow) be coherent, since this sort of interrelatedness is required for God's causal connection to the universe."

M₂ :As an experienced philosopher of religion, I have never heard any theistic philosopher make this assertion, and the author provides no references to authors asserting this.

M₃ : Maybe theistic philosophers have to think the concept is coherent, but to my knowledge none has ever argued that it must be coherent simply because God is creator.

M₄: Attributing this position to these unnamed theistic philosophers makes it sound like theistic philosophers are people who will automatically believe whatever is required so that theism comes out as a coherent position. It seems to me the author is simply setting up a straw man.

Metaphysicians who specifically study relations commonly mention to the realm crossing puzzle (this is one of the primary issues surrounding the Platonism vs. Aristotelianism debate[1]). I am going to refer to this puzzle surrounding “realm crossing” relations as a mystery, and since no coherent account of realm crossing relations has been outlined by philosophers of religion, it seems I am justified in calling it one. The theistic philosopher has no reason to focus on this mystery: being trained primarily in philosophy of religion rather than the metaphysics of relations, she/he consequently does not know about the fine-grained details of the metaphysics of the relations that philosophers of religion make use of in their philosophy of religion. For that reason, philosophers of religion do not consider the mysteriousness of the realm crossing God-to-nature relating. But this is no secret to philosophers who are trained in the study of the fine-grinned details of relations, as Armstrong’s passage in my paper shows. Manson tells us in M₂ (and perhaps also implies in M₃) that philosophers of religion do not tell us that they assume the relation is coherent. No; instead they just go ahead and make the assumption, as Manson indicates in M₂ and M₃, but do not tell us they are making an assumption. So, when, on page 4, I say, “…philosophers assert that the concept of a relation between… entities in space and an entity (or entities) not in space must… be coherent…” the word “assert” there does not denote what they say they are doing by their informing us of what they are doing. Rather, it denotes just what they are in fact doing, but where they do not tell us they are doing it. This is an assertion via assumption. (And it is much like the sort of asserting that physicists do about space: I have not seen this vast container called space that holds all physical items, I can’t come up with a non-problematical account of it—but the relativity theorist don’t tell me this, and they will nevertheless demand (against Leibniz, perhaps Victor Stenger) that it exists, exists lest their philosophy of space involve serious ontological difficulties or questions.

Interestingly, the theistic assertion could inadvertently appear as a concealment (analogous to the way relativity theorists often conceal problems with their theory: the metaphysicality of space, the quantum entanglement experiments, etc.). In other words, by not specifically pointing out any questionableness to do with realm crossing relations (M₂ and M₃) between God and nature, this could appear to the atheist that they are specifically not discussing in their metaphysics, in order to keep if from being questioned, and in order to keep the appearance that theism is a reasonable position to hold. What I have just written prompts me to establish my own principle, G₁:

G₁: Philosophers of religion have insufficient understanding of the fine-grained details of the causal relations (or perhaps, for some, the causal processes) that their theistic philosophy depends on

(More of what is coming below supports G₁.) In M₂ and M₃ Manson paraphrases G₁: no argument or explanation exists among theists justifying the mysteriousness realm crossing relation, and no analysis exists, and I thus move to my principle G₂:

G₂: The theistic philosopher does not pay attention to the details of the metaphysics of relations involved in her/his philosophy of monotheistic religion, and what she/he does instead is merely assert that there must be a realm crossing causal connection, without telling us how it works, all in order to stand by the belief that God exists, without allowing room for questioning the obvious mystery here.

In a similar vein as the example above about space, establishing G₂, as M₂and M₃ seem to show theists are doing, is just like maintaining that infinitesimals are coherent just so we can say that calculus is ontologically coherent. This is also like saying that there must be ether just so we can maintain that light propagates through something, rather than through empty space, or “through nothing.” Theists espouse G₂ and clear their minds of, and eliminate worry about, the metaphysical minutia. But the point of my article is to show that if we merely take a look at those relations then theism no longer has such an easy ride.

I wrote my article based on a very simple assumption: theistic philosophers ubiquitously believe that God caused (and/or continuously causes) the universe—they ubiquitously assume the existence of a causal interaction of some sort (causal process, connection, etc.) between God and spatial items—but what is interesting is philosophers of religion have not explained how the enigmatic causal interaction takes place between the spatially located item/items from the spatially unlocated item. Philosophers of religion discuss many matters that are dependent on the existence of the very causal interaction itself, but do not give an account of the causal interaction that the entire notion of God depends on.

(v) The entire introduction is too long. The central points could be stated in a page and a half, but the author takes three and a half pages to get to the meat of the argument - his critique of the idea of "realm-crossing" relations.

(E) My response here will be similar to point (D) just given. Since philosophers of religion are unfamiliar with the details to do with the subject of my paper (the details of the causal relation), I can assume they have insufficient knowledge of he exemplification tie, which is theorized to exist due to Bradley’s regress. (That they do not know the details of the exemplification tie and Bradley’s regress may be supported by some things Manson says below.)

(vi) Much of the core argumentation occurs in the footnotes (especially footnote 6). Arguing in the footnotes is a stylistic no-no. The author is advised to find every way possible to shift argumentative material from the footnotes into the main text.

(F) My response here follows from (D) and (E). It may seem appropriate to a philosopher of religion to place those details—which only involve simple issues in metaphysics—directly in the paper. But those who study relations—the subject of my paper, don’t need this introductory information and it would seem inappropriate to them, since what is in the footnotes is nothing but very basic metaphysics, all taken from metaphysics books that could be used in undergraduate or graduate introductory metaphysics courses. In fact, in teaching the 300-level Topics in Metaphysics in Spring of 2005 at Indiana University Northwest, I used these very books.

2) The author never explains why the focus of his argument is the God-world relationship.

(i) As the author himself notes (p. 3 - first paragraph of the introduction), diverse philosophers are committed to realm-crossing relationships: traditional platonists, extreme realists, theists, mind-body dualists, some philosophers of mathematics (the platonist ones?), and some philosophers of physics (which ones? those who endorse multiple universe theories?). It would help if the author explained in each of these cases why the relevant position requires realm-crossing relations. Instead, the author just drops names of philosophical positions in passing. This represents a missed opportunity for the author to give his arguments greater relevance and a wider audience.

(H) It would be irrelevant for me to discuss at length complex areas of philosophy such as these, when they have nothing to do with my subject: God’s nonexistence. I respect my Professor Manson’s position that this is a missed opportunity, but I took that opportunity in an earlier article published in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review.

(iii) To follow up on point (ii), the author says (section 2.1, paragraph 2): "Let 'realm crossing relation' denote any relation that stands between entities in space and an entity not in space." But this is an insufficiently general definition. It is common in metaphysics to refer to the realm of Platonic entities as "the third realm," which obviously suggests that realm-crossing relations are not restricted to relations for which one of the relata is spatial. For example, the theist thinks God knows all propositions, so theists are committed to a relationship – "......knows......" – that would hold between two entities that are not in space: God and some proposition. Though both are nonspatial, clearly this is a realm-crossing relationship because it holds between a concrete object (God) and an abstract object (a proposition). Likewise, the mind-body dualist is committed to two sorts of realm-crossing relationships: between minds and bodies, but also between minds and propositions. A better definition of 'realm crossing relation' would be "any relation that stands between entities of different realms, including but not limited to the physical realm, the spiritual realm, and the platonic realm."

(J) I agree with everything Professor Manson says, but none of it shows a problem with my analysis in the article. In this article, realm crossing specifically denotes aspatial-to-nature relating. Though the terms “realm crossing” could be described between, for example, two distinct aspatial realms, as Manson points out, I of course do not use it in that sense, since I am merely following the usage of the term in the passage in the early part of my article from D. M. Armstrong, where Armstrong specifically means relations between the spatially located and the spatially located. That is where I get my definition of the phrase “realm crossing relation” from, and throughout the article I only use it in that sense. So the phrase is limited to that usage only, following Armstrong. Since I clearly set up this restriction for myself, there is no reason for me to discuss any realm crossing between two spatially unlocated realms, when clearly throughout the article I am only concerned with spatially unlocated to spatial realm crossing. Professor Manson is interested in a “better term than ‘realm crossing relation,’” which I think is a good point, but that is something he would have to take up with Armstrong, and what the specific label is to be for the relation between God and nature is irrelevant to my reasoning.

3) The basic ideas of "intermediaries" and "unmediated attachments" are not clearly defined or explained, and so the author’s core argument for the impossibility of realm-crossing relations simply cannot be assessed.

(i) The key term "unmediated attachment" is never adequately defined in the main text. After a hasty attempt at definition in section 2.1, paragraph 3, the author proceeds as if the reader just knows what is meant by “unmediated attachment.” The only real attempt at an explanation of unmediated attachments in footnote 6. This material should be incorporated into the main text some how.

(K) Given G1, it may seem to be a “hasty attempt” on my part to describe the unumedated attachment as I did, but I will show that it is not. But first, notice that, in his comment, Manson does not tell me why it is hasty—which, as stated I will challenge—but he just states that it is with no explanation.

Now, moving to description of the unmediated attachment, it is hard for me to believe that Professor Manson hold this to be a hasty definition, when endnote 6 verifies that I am merely describing it in terms passed down from Loux, who gets his analysis from studying the regress of Bradley. So, we are, in the end, talking about a long tradition of philosophers—Bradley, Frege, Russell, Strawson, and more recently Armstrong, Loux, and Lowe—that all followed from the impetus of the discovery of Bradley’s regress. There are few more basic metaphysical issues than Bradley’s regress, which, as endnote 6 shows, leads to a non-relational (and, according to some, primitive) non-relational tie between property and particular. But, as should follow from G₁ (and perhaps G₂), I don’t think Professor Manson knows that that is what is being discussed here. I say this because “unmediated attachment” is merely a synonym for one of the two views of an “exemplification tie” (instantiation tie), but Professor Manson maintains, as you say in Manson’s 4) (iii) he attempts to describe the interrelatedness of entities without mention of the tie, and in fact he appears to specifically ignore its existence. More on this in a moment. But again, Professor Manson’s straw man account that asserts that I am merely giving a “hasty” description, could, in the end, be no more than evidence for G₁.

But to be fair, perhaps what Professor Manson is not pleased with is, justifiably, the lack of clarity on what the exemplification tie between properties and particulars, and between relata and relations, is. Michael Loux most clearly discusses it, as I’ve shown in the endnotes. But not much is discussed other than that it is supposed to be an ad hoc device used to merely avoid Bradley’s Regress, rather than to take on what Bradley disclosed.

(ii) In section 2.1, paragraph 3, the author does not give any examples of unmediated attachments. Do unmediated attachments come in two types: the realm crossing ones and the non-(realm crossing) ones? If there are non-(realm crossing) unmediated attachments, it would help the reader grasp the concept of an unmediated attachment by giving an example of a non-(realm crossing) one – for example, an unmediated attachment between two spatial entities, or two spiritual entities. Yet the author gives no such example. The author offers Loux’s metaphor of the links on the chain (see my commentary on footnote 6 below), but I am not sure if that is supposed to count as an unmediated attachment.

(L) For the first of what Manson writs, this is perhaps the strongest support for G1 in Manson’s comments. This is because Professor Manson wants examples of the exemplification tie’s unmediated attachment. But isn’t there only one, since it is a device specifically developed, following Bradley, in property possession? It is not ordinary contacting or touching, such as when the finger touches the wall, since that is some sort of relation. The exemplification tie is a non-relational linking (see Loux 1998, 38-41), specifically referred to in property-to-particular linkages (in our case, it is relational properties that we are considering).

Now, for what comes next in Manson’s comment… Yes, two types are needed, as outlined in points 1 and 2 at the start of section 2.2, and in the third-to-last paragraph of 2.2. There are no examples of unmediated attachments than can be given, since they are non-relational attachments (see endnote 6), and I do not know of any other non-relational attachments other than these.

At the end of the comment, Manson refers to unmediated attachment as if it can hold between any entities. Since, as mentioned, unmediated attachment is between property and property instantiate (so-called thin or think particular), as is well known by metaphysicians who study properties (property possession) and relations, but Manson refers to it has occurring between states of affairs, which are substances, this confusion again gives evidence for G1: Manson, as with apparently the rest of the philosophers of religion, do not have any substantial understanding of the (risky) metaphysics that they base their theism on.

(iii) One thing that is clear is that the idea of unmediated attachment is supposed to be in contrast with the idea of a realm crossing relation which is an intermediary. A realm crossing relation which is an intermediary involves three things: the relata in their separate realms, plus the relation. Yet in footnote 6 the author says “an unmediated attachment between a relation and its relata is an entity (in the broadest sense of ‘entity’) that is a special ‘unmediated linkage’.” So (keeping count) once again we have three things: the two relata and this “entity that is a special ‘unmediated linkage’.” Unmediated linkages vs. intermediaries, the entity count is still three vs. three. So I don’t see how this attempt to distinguish unmediated attachments from intermediaries makes things any clearer.

(M) This mostly repeats Manson’s last point, and since Manson here is equating an unmediated attachment (exemplification tie) with the relation “in contrast with”, which would be to say that a relation = the exemplification tie connecting it to itself and the thin or thick particular.

(iv) The author provides Loux’s metaphor – a mediated attachment is like a rope connecting a boat to a pier, while an unmediated attachment is a “linking” like that between two rings on a chain. In the latter case, there is no extra thing that links the chains (as the rope connects the boat to the pier). This makes a bit more sense. Boat + pier + rope = three things.

Notice how Manson says Boat + pier + rope is three things, when clearly there are “+” signs, which are the very exemplification tie! But Manson does not see this, proven by his saying there are “three things”, where Manson even underlines the word three! This is just more great support for G₁ (and G₂). And if we took his confidence, implied by the underlining, seriously, we’d have relations and boat (instantiator) only, and no special instantiation tie—and this would merely lead to Bradley’s regress.

(Notice it starts to feel here as if Manson is just sifting through this material for the first time (e.g., his comment, “This makes a bit more sense…”, as if were are talking about something new here, that we weren’t a few paragraphs back.))

Circular piece of metal A + circular piece of metal B = two things. But just what is it in virtue of which circular piece of metal A and circular piece of metal B count as linked? What is the difference between the state of affairs of A and B lying on a table next to one another and the state of affairs of A and B being linked to one another?

This involves a misunderstanding of how Loux uses “link”. LINK is the exemplification tie, or how the tie ties (see endnote 6). I am using the word “link”, following Loux (note 6), to denote the exemplification tie. But Manson is using it to refer to the properties (relational properties) shared by two substances (states of affairs A and B). More evidence for G₁.

It is nothing intrinsic to A and it is nothing intrinsic to B. The observable properties of A and of B themselves are the same in both states of affairs. What distinguishes the second state of affairs is that A and B stand in the “…..is linked to….” relation to one another. And, at risk of seeming thick, I just do not see how to account for that difference without talking about a third entity: the “…..is linked to…..” relationship. In that case, however, we still have three entities on the “intermediary” picture and three entities on the “unmediated attachment” picture, and so we are back to the problem mentioned in the paragraph above.

(v) The author’s entire case for the impossibility of a realm-crossing relationship is that such a relationship would require an unmediated attachment between entities of different realms. His key claim is that there is no explanation “of how, exactly, a wholly spatially located entity and a wholly spatially unlocated entity can be involved in unmediated attachment.” But since the concept of an unmediated attachment is obscure, we simply cannot judge whether the author’s case stands or falls.

This is a very significant point here. Manson is calling the work of Armstrong, Loux, etc. obscure. Fine. Let’s go with that. There are two points to consider.

(N)1: What is interesting here is that Manson appears to be trying to assert that the relating of God to nature is indescribable, and thus to hide problems involved. Clearly his account above is a straw man, not in an area of research he has expertise in, it seems, but he is nevertheless confident enough to maintain that my account fails, and therefore we can adopt a position that we have not explanation for God’s interrelating to the universe (“But since the concept of an unmediated attachment is obscure, we simply cannot judge whether the author’s case stands or falls”). This is exactly what I pointed out goes on in G₁ and G₂: philosophers of religion inform us that the relations must exist, but they cannot tell us how, and they will attempt to not discuss (cover up?) any possible problems with the relations, as Manson does in this straw man account which he nevertheless still maintains is incoherent.

(N)2: I will next show that it would not even matter of Mason’s claims were somehow correct, and that my account fails, for a very specific reason: Manson never mentions page 9, the most important page. Pretend all my metaphysical analysis is wrong, and throw it out. Even if that is the case, according to traditional theism, God is nevertheless still outside of space, and thus to interact with it, he still will have to interact or contact or “touch” it in some way. My analysis on page 9 shows that any spatial-aspatial interaction or “touching” is impossible, no matter what you call the items involved. What Manson does is merely try to undercut my argumentation before this critical page, as if there is a problem with my analysis, and thus if there is, he need not attempt to tackle page 9, which he does not bring up. This seems more support for this cover-up hypothesis I mention above.

Let me put this important point in different words. For God to have interaction with nature, there is some sort of a continuous integration between any sort of spatially located item (L) and a spatially unlocated item is impossible (~L). Details ultimately don’t matter, this interaction will ultimately come up. Manson attacked the way(s) I tried to describe the way I led up to the L to ~L interface/integration, by maintaining that I misused metaphysical terminology, but he never shows in any way how the L-to-~L interface is problematical in any way. If ALL my metaphysical analysis was incorrect, the causation of the universe by God would still be impossible since it at any rate still requires L-to-~L interfacing or integrating of some sort, which is impossible.

5) The author's rejection of the idea that God interacted with the initial singularity implies that the singularity bears no causal relationship to the universe.

(i) The author considers the claim that God could have created the universe without crossing realms by creating the initial singularity. Since the initial singularity is simple and not spatially located, saying God created it would not confront whatever problems confront the idea that God created spatial entities. But if the author really believes he is giving a general argument against realm-crossing relationships, it should not matter whether the singularity is or is not spatial. The fact will remain that God is in one realm and the singularity in another [“the fourth realm”?]. If the author's general arguments are sound, God cannot bear a causal relationship to the singularity.

(ii) Instead, the author says the problem with the claim that God created the universe by creating the singularity is that the singularity is not spatial and hence was never part of the universe. He quotes Quentin Smith as saying "the singularity at t₀ is not a part of the universe and a fortiori is not the earliest part of the universe. Rather it is a source of the universe." But if the singularity itself is non-spatial, then – applying the general rule advanced by the author that realm-crossing relations are impossible – there is no sense to the idea that the singularity bears any relationship at all to the universe. The universe is in the spatial realm and the singularity is not. Conversely, if the author is willing to allow that the singularity does bear a causal relationship to the universe even though they are in different realms, how can he deny that God bears a causal relationship to the universe though God and the universe are in different realms? Perhaps the author should write another paper here: “The Singularity’s Spatial Unlocatedness Prevents It from being the Source of the Universe.” Once again – why are we getting an anti-theistic argument as opposed to any an argument such as this one?

(ii) Seeing as the author claims his argument against realm-crossing relations is an all-purpose one, it is curious that he never explains to his reader why he restricts himself to drawing the conclusion that God does not exist. If he really thinks he has an all-purpose argument against realm-crossing relationships, then why not draw out the consequence that all of the philosophers mentioned in (i) above - traditional platonists, extreme realists, etc. - are wrong? In short, why pick only on the theists? Since no rationale is given for this specific focus, the reader gets the impression the author has an extra-philosophical, anti-theist agenda.

(I) Again, I do this in other articles, and I carry out such an attack against these groups in an earlier article published in Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review.

Professor Manson does however raise an issue that is interesting: he presumes, correctly, that I have “an extra-philosophical, anti-theist agenda.” This is not an issue perhaps relevant in any way to discuss at a philosophy conference. But it is definitely an interesting point, Professor Manson has assumed correctly about my specific agenda, and since I am obligated to respond, I will make a few comments.

The Bible is a very old and violent book. It is absolutely loaded with sadistic violence, incest, genocide, rape, and child-murder. In many places in the Bible, believers are instructed to kill nonbelievers. In the Bible these acts are often said to be glorified by God. (See www.SkepticsAnnotatedBible.com for a complete list.) It is amazing that this stuff is considered the word of God, and therefore holy, and that it is taught to our children, all while we censure films, news, and television for its violence. Furthermore, the Bible was written very long ago; now the world is different, we know much more, we have gone through both scientific and industrial revolutions, and there is no clear reason I can see why we should have this old, and, frankly, peculiar book of violence and terror dictate our beliefs in the contemporary time. Some of you might be angered by what I am saying. But why are you angered with me? Are these passages not in the Bible? (Examples given below.) Are they not the very sorts of atrocities we hear Bush mentioning all the time? Remember the Chechnyan terror? A school full of dead children in the name of Islamic terror.[1] Compare this to Leviticus 26:16-39:

God describes the torments that he has planned for those who displease him. The usual stuff: plagues, burning fevers that will consume the eyes, etc. but he reserves the worst for the little children. He says "ye shall sow your seed in vain, for your enemies shall eat it," "I will send wild beasts among you, which shall rob you of your children," and "ye shall eat the flesh of your sons and daughters."[2] (Thanks to www.SkepticsAnnotatedBible.com for this reference.)

I imagine I am angering many of you by these words right now. I am sorry, and I don’t mean to. But all I have done is cite scripture, and thus there is really no need to be angry at me.

(Those interested in this subject should see Sam Harris, The End of Faith, which these ideas I just expressed come from.)

[1] See pages 66-67 of Armstrong, David, 2001, “Universals as Attributes,” in Loux, Michael, Metaphysics: Contemporary Readings, Routledge: New York: 65-92.

[1] For any of you who may have forgotten this event last year, here’s a refresher:

Funerals for 334 people, half of them children. Hundreds more -- we may never know how many -- in hospitals or "missing," presumed dead. A town ravaged, a school destroyed, photographs of bloody children, wailing mothers. This is what the Chechen terrorists who attacked and destroyed a school in Beslan, southern Russia, achieved with their guns and bombs last week.

But did they "achieve" anything else? One of the hardest things to understand about tragedies such as the one in Beslan is the motivation of the murderers. At the moment little is known about their identities, except that they seem to have been led by local Chechens and Ingush. Officials claim some were Arabs, although former hostages have not yet confirmed that. Little is known about their stated aims, which allegedly included independence for the Russian republic of Chechnya, withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and an end to the nearly 10 years of brutal Russian-Chechen conflict in Chechnya. The only certainty is that they will achieve none of them.

Quote from “The Irrationality of Terror”, By Anne Applebaum, Washington Post, September 8, 2004; page A23.

[2] Also consider

Under God's direction, Moses' army defeats the Midianites. They kill all the adult males, but take the women and children captive. When Moses learns that they left some live, he angrily says: "Have you saved all the women alive? Kill every male among the little ones, and kill every woman that hath known man by lying with him. But all the women children, that have not known a man by lying with him, keep alive for yourselves." So they went back and did as Moses (and presumably God) instructed, killing everyone except for the virgins. In this way they got 32,000 virgins. Numbers 31:1-54

(Thanks again to www.SkepticsAnnotatedBible.com for this passage.)

This is just the tip of the iceberg. See www.SkepticsAnnotatedBible.com.