Comments on "The
Impossibility of God."
(iv) The author claims (again on p. 4) that "Often philosophers assert
that the concept of a relation between or among entities in space and an
entity (or entities) not in space must (somehow) be coherent, since
this sort of interrelatedness is required for God's causal connection
to the universe." As an experienced philosopher of religion, I have
never heard any theistic philosopher make this assertion, and the author
provides no references to authors asserting this. Maybe theistic
philosophers have to think the concept is coherent, but to my knowledge
none has ever argued that it must be coherent simply because
God is creator. Attributing this position to these unnamed
theistic philosophers makes it sound like theistic philosophers are people
who will automatically believe whatever is required so that theism comes
out as a coherent position. It seems to me the author is simply setting up
a straw man.
(v) The entire introduction is too long. The central points could be
stated in a page and a half, but the author takes three and a half pages
to get to the meat of the argument - his critique of the idea of
"realm-crossing" relations.
(vi) Much of the core argumentation occurs in the footnotes (especially
footnote 6). Arguing in the footnotes is a stylistic no-no. The author is
advised to find every way possible to shift argumentative material from
the footnotes into the main text.
2) The author never explains why the focus of his argument is the
God-world relationship.
(i)
As the author himself notes (p. 3 - first paragraph of the introduction),
diverse philosophers are committed to realm-crossing relationships:
traditional platonists, extreme realists, theists, mind-body dualists,
some philosophers of mathematics (the platonist ones?), and some
philosophers of physics (which ones? those who endorse multiple universe
theories?). It would help if the author explained in each of these cases
why the relevant position requires realm-crossing relations. Instead, the
author just drops names of philosophical positions in passing. This
represents a missed opportunity for the author to give his arguments
greater relevance and a wider audience.
(ii) Seeing as the author claims his argument against realm-crossing
relations is an all-purpose one, it is curious that he never explains to
his reader why he restricts himself to drawing the conclusion that God
does not exist. If he really thinks he has an all-purpose argument against
realm-crossing relationships, then why not draw out the consequence that
all of the philosophers mentioned in (i) above - traditional platonists,
extreme realists, etc. - are wrong? In short, why pick only on the
theists? Since no rationale is given for this specific focus, the reader
gets the impression the author has an extra-philosophical, anti-theist
agenda.
(iii) To follow up on point (ii), the author says (section 2.1, paragraph
2): "Let 'realm crossing relation' denote any relation that stands between
entities in space and an entity not in space." But this is an
insufficiently general definition. It is common in metaphysics to refer to
the realm of Platonic entities as "the third realm," which obviously
suggests that realm-crossing relations are not restricted to relations for
which one of the relata is spatial. For example, the theist thinks God
knows all propositions, so theists are committed to a relationship –
"......knows......" – that would hold between two entities that are not in
space: God and some proposition. Though both are nonspatial, clearly this
is a realm-crossing relationship because it holds between a concrete
object (God) and an abstract object (a proposition). Likewise, the
mind-body dualist is committed to two sorts of realm-crossing
relationships: between minds and bodies, but also between minds and
propositions. A better definition of 'realm crossing relation' would be
"any relation that stands between entities of different realms, including
but not limited to the physical realm, the spiritual realm, and the
platonic realm."
3) The basic ideas of "intermediaries" and "unmediated attachments" are
not clearly defined or explained, and so the author’s core argument for
the impossibility of realm-crossing relations simply cannot be assessed.
(i)
The key term "unmediated attachment" is never adequately defined in
the main text. After a hasty attempt at definition in section 2.1,
paragraph 3, the author proceeds as if the reader just knows what is meant
by “unmediated attachment.” The only real attempt at an explanation of
unmediated attachments in footnote 6. This material should be incorporated
into the main text some how.
(ii) In section 2.1, paragraph 3, the author does not give any examples
of unmediated attachments. Do unmediated attachments come in two types:
the realm crossing ones and the non-(realm crossing) ones? If there are
non-(realm crossing) unmediated attachments, it would help the reader
grasp the concept of an unmediated attachment by giving an example of a
non-(realm crossing) one – for example, an unmediated attachment between
two spatial entities, or two spiritual entities. Yet the author gives no
such example. The author offers Loux’s metaphor of the links on the chain
(see my commentary on footnote 6 below), but I am not sure if that is
supposed to count as an unmediated attachment.
(iii) One thing that is clear is that the idea of unmediated attachment is
supposed to be in contrast with the idea of a realm crossing
relation which is an intermediary. A realm crossing relation which is an
intermediary involves three things: the relata in their separate realms,
plus the relation. Yet in footnote 6 the author says “an unmediated
attachment between a relation and its relata is an entity (in the broadest
sense of ‘entity’) that is a special ‘unmediated linkage’.” So (keeping
count) once again we have three things: the two relata and this “entity
that is a special ‘unmediated linkage’.” Unmediated linkages vs.
intermediaries, the entity count is still three vs. three. So I don’t see
how this attempt to distinguish unmediated attachments from intermediaries
makes things any clearer.
(iv) The author provides Loux’s metaphor – a mediated attachment is like a
rope connecting a boat to a pier, while an unmediated attachment is a
“linking” like that between two rings on a chain. In the latter case,
there is no extra thing that links the chains (as the rope connects the
boat to the pier). This makes a bit more sense. Boat + pier + rope =
three things. Circular piece of metal A + circular piece of metal B =
two things. But just what is it in virtue of which circular piece
of metal A and circular piece of metal B count as linked? What is
the difference between the state of affairs of A and B lying on a table
next to one another and the state of affairs of A and B being linked to
one another? It is nothing intrinsic to A and it is nothing intrinsic to
B. The observable properties of A and of B themselves are the same in both
states of affairs. What distinguishes the second state of affairs is that
A and B stand in the “…..is linked to….” relation to one another. And, at
risk of seeming thick, I just do not see how to account for that
difference without talking about a third entity: the “…..is linked to…..”
relationship. In that case, however, we still have three entities on the
“intermediary” picture and three entities on the “unmediated attachment”
picture, and so we are back to the problem mentioned in the paragraph
above.
(v) The author’s entire case for the impossibility of a realm-crossing
relationship is that such a relationship would require an unmediated
attachment between entities of different realms. His key claim is
that there is no explanation “of how, exactly, a wholly spatially
located entity and a wholly spatially unlocated entity can be involved in
unmediated attachment.” But since the concept of an unmediated attachment
is obscure, we simply cannot judge whether the author’s case stands or
falls.
5) The author's rejection of the idea that God interacted with the
initial singularity implies that the singularity bears no causal
relationship to the universe.
(i)
The author considers the claim that God could have created the universe
without crossing realms by creating the initial singularity. Since the
initial singularity is simple and not spatially located, saying God
created it would not confront whatever problems confront the idea that God
created spatial entities. But if the author really believes he is giving a
general argument against realm-crossing relationships, it should not
matter whether the singularity is or is not spatial. The fact will remain
that God is in one realm and the singularity in another [“the fourth
realm”?]. If the author's general arguments are sound, God cannot bear a
causal relationship to the singularity.
(ii) Instead, the author says the problem with the claim that God created
the universe by creating the singularity is that the singularity is not
spatial and hence was never part of the universe. He quotes Quentin Smith
as saying "the singularity at t0 is not a part of the universe
and a fortiori is not the earliest part of the universe. Rather it
is a source of the universe." But if the singularity itself is
non-spatial, then – applying the general rule advanced by the author that
realm-crossing relations are impossible – there is no sense to the idea
that the singularity bears any relationship at all to the universe.
The universe is in the spatial realm and the singularity is not.
Conversely, if the author is willing to allow that the singularity does
bear a causal relationship to the universe even though they are in
different realms, how can he deny that God bears a causal relationship to
the universe though God and the universe are in different realms? Perhaps
the author should write another paper here: “The Singularity’s Spatial
Unlocatedness Prevents It from being the Source of the Universe.” Once
again – why are we getting an anti-theistic argument as opposed to any an
argument such as this one?
